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Abstract
This paper develops a simple competitive model of CEO pay. It
appears to explain much of the rise in CEO compensation in the US
economy, without assuming managerial entrenchment, mishandling of
options, or theft. CEOs have observable managerial talent and are
matched to assets in a competitive assignment model. The marginal
impact of a CEO’s talent is assumed to increase with the value of the
assets under his control. Under very general assumptions, using results
from extreme value theory, the model determines the level of CEO
pay across ﬁrms and over time, and the pay-sensitivity relations. We
predict that the level of CEO compensation should increase one for one
with the average market capitalization of large ﬁrms in the economy.
Therefore, the eight-fold increase of CEO pay between 1980 and 2000
can be fully attributed to the increase in market capitalization of large
US companies. The model predicts the cross-section Cobb-Douglass
relation between pay and ﬁrm size and can be used to study other large
changes at the top of the income distribution, and oﬀers a benchmark
for calibratable corporate ﬁnance.
∗xgabaix@mit.edu, alandier@stern.nyu.edu. For helpful comments, we thank
David Yermack and seminar participants at MIT.
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
This paper proposes a neoclassical model of equilibrium CEO compensation.
It is simple, tractable, calibratable. CEOs have observable managerial talent
and are matched to ﬁrms competitively. The marginal impact of a CEO’s
talent is assumed to increase with the value of the assets under his control.
It makes deﬁnite predictions about CEO pay across ﬁrms, across countries,
and across time. It also appears to explain, quantitatively, much of the rise
in CEO compensation since the 1980s. In the model’s view, this increase in
pay is due to the rise in the market value of ﬁrms.
Our talent market is neoclassical and frictionless: Talent is observable, so
that the equilibrium allocation is eﬃcient. The best CEOs go to the bigger
ﬁrms, which maximizes their impact. In the benchmark case, incentive
considerations do not matter. The paper extends earlier work (e.g., Rosen
1982, 1992, Tervio 2003), by draws from extreme value theory to get general
functional forms about the spacing of the distribution of talents. This allows
to solve for everything in closed form without loss of generality, and get
concrete predictions. In equilibrium, under very general conditions, the
compensation of a CEO in ﬁrm i is:






where κ and D are positive constant, S∗ is the size of a reference ﬁrm (e.g.,
the market capitalization of the median ﬁrm in the S&P 500), and Sit is the
size of ﬁrm i. Hence, the model generates the well-established Cobb-Douglas
relation between compensation and size (with κ ' 0.3 empirically).
The model also predicts that average compensation should move one for
one with typical market capitalization S∗ of ﬁrms. Figures 1 and 2 oﬀer some
suggestive evidence for this eﬀect. Historically, in the U.S. at least, the rise
of CEO compensation coincided with an increase in market capitalization of
the largest ﬁrms. Between 1980 and 2000, the average market capitalization
of S&P 500 ﬁrms has increased by a factor of 8 (i.e. a 700% increase).1 The
model predicts that CEO pay should increase by a factor 8. The result is just
driven by the scarcity of CEOs, competitive forces, and the 8-fold increase
in stock market valuations. Incentive concerns or managerial entrenchment
play strictly no role in this model of CEO compensation. In our view, the
question of the rise in CEO compensation is a simple mirror of the rise in
1The average market capitalization of ﬁrms in the S&P 500, was $2.9 billion in 1980,
and $24 billion in 2000. The numbers are in real 2000 dollars. Source: CRSP.
2the value of large US companies since the 80s. Our model also predicts that
countries experiencing a lower rise in ﬁrm value than the US should also have
experienced lower executive compensation growth, which resonates with the
European experience.
The rise in executive compensation has triggered a large amount of
public controversy and academic research. Our theory is to be compared
with the three main types of economic arguments that have been put forward
to explain this phenomenon.
The ﬁrst explanation attributes the increase in CEO compensation to
the widespread adoption of compensation packages with high-powered in-
centives since the late 80s. Holmstron and Kaplan (2001, 2003) link the rise
of compensation value to the rise in stock-based compensation following the
"LBO revolution" of the 80s. Both academics and shareholder activists have
been pushing throughout the 90s for stronger and market-based managerial
incentives (e.g. Jensen and Murphy 1990). According to Inderst and Muller
(2005) and Dow and Raposo (2005), higher incentives have become optimal
due to increased volatility in the business environment faced by ﬁrms. In the
presence of limited liability and/or risk-aversion, increasing the performance
sensitivity of a CEO’s compensation, keeping his participation constraint un-
changed, requires an increase in the dollar value of compensation. However,
this link between the level and the "slope" of compensation has not been
extensively calibrated: CEOs of large companies are typically very wealthy
individuals. One can doubt that their level of risk-aversion and limited lia-
bility constraint represent quantitatively important economic frictions. For
this reason, it remains unclear that increased incentives can explain the very
large increase in CEO rents.
Following the wave of corporate scandals and the public focus on the
limits of the US corporate governance system, a "skimming view" of CEO
compensation has gained momentum. The tenants of the "skimming view"
(e.g. Bebchuk et al. (2002)) explain the rise of CEO compensation simply
by an increase in managerial entrenchment. "When changing circumstances
create an opportunity to extract additional rents–either by changing out-
rage costs and constraints or by giving rise to a new means of camouﬂage–
managers will seek to take full advantage of it and will push ﬁrms toward
an equilibrium in which they can do so". Stock-option plans are viewed by
these authors as a way to increase CEO compensation without attracting
too much notice from the shareholders. According to them, "high-powered
incentives" is just an excuse used by management to justify higher "rent-
extraction". A milder form of the skimming view is expressed in Hall and
Murphy (2003) and Jensen, Murphy and Wruck (2004). They attribute the
3explosion in the level of stock-option pay to an inability of boards to evaluate
the true costs of this form of compensation. " Why has option compensa-
tion increased? Why has it increased with the market? (...) We believe the
reason is that option grant decisions are made by board members and execu-
tives who believe (incorrectly) that options are a low-cost way to pay people
and do not know or care that the value (and cost) of an option rises as the
ﬁrm’s share price rises"2. These forces have almost certainly been at work,
but it is unclear how important they are in the main. The present paper
oﬀers a competitive benchmark, and indicates that forces of deception may
not be a main determinant of the typical CEO compensation: according to
our theory, the rise in US CEO compensation is an equilibrium consequence
of the massive increase in ﬁrm size.
A third type of explanation relates the increase in CEO compensation to
changes in the nature of the CEO job. Hermalin (2004) argues that the rise
in CEO compensation reﬂects tighter corporate governance. To compensate
CEOs for the increased likelihood of being ﬁred, their pay must increase.
Frydman (2006) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2005) provide evidence of a
rise in "general skills" required on CEO jobs. As less ﬁrm-speciﬁcs k i l l sa n d
more general skills become valuable, CEOs participate to a more competitive
labor market and have higher outside options than before, leading to higher
pay. However, a main diﬃculty with their proposal is quantitative. Changes
in the talent composition appear small to moderate (Frydman 2005), while
the level of CEO compensation increase by a factor of 5 to 10. It is hard
to envision a calibrated model where moderate changes could explain very
large changes in levels of compensation. Moreover, given the rise in the
number of MBAs among executives and the spread of executive education,
one can doubt that the scarcity of general skills is a plausible explanation
for the rise in CEO compensation. In contrast, our model explains this
increase readily. When stock market valuations are 5 times larger, CEO
“productivity”, which is proportional to ﬁrm value, increases by 5, and
pay increases by 5 as ﬁrms compete to attract talent. In the economy we
describe, total pay is independent of agency problems, and is just determined
by the scarcity of CEO talent and the ﬁrms’ demand for this talent. Agency
considerations determine, in a second and subordinate step, the relative mix
of average pay and incentives. This way, one derives a simple benchmark
for the pay-sensitivity estimates that have caused much academic discussion
(Jensen and Murphy 1990, Hall and Liebman 1998, Murphy 1999, Bebchuk
and Fried 2003).
2Jensen, Murphy and Wruck[2004].
4Finally, the model oﬀers a calibration, which could be useful for future
studies, a step that may be important to develop quantitative, calibratable
corporate ﬁnance.
The core model is in section 2. Section 3 presents the model’s predictions
for pay to performance debate. Section 4 presents various extensions. In
particular, it examines the equilibrium pay if some ﬁrm underestimate the
true cost of stock options. Section 5 proposes a calibration of the quantities
used in the model.
2B a s i c m o d e l
There is a continuum of ﬁrms and potential managers, indexed by x ∈
[0,X].F i r mx has size S (x), which is best thought of as earnings or market
capitalization, while manager x has talent T (x).L o w x means a larger
ﬁrm or a more talented manager: S0 (x) < 0, T0 (x) < 0. In equilibrium, a
manager of talent T receives a compensation ω(T).
We consider a ﬁrm’s problem. The ﬁrm starts with earnings a0. 3 At
t =0 , it hires a manager of talent T for one period. The manager’s talent
increases the ﬁrm’s earnings as:
a1 = a0 (1 + CT) (2)
for some C>0. C represents how much a CEO talent increases this year’s
earnings.
First, suppose that the CEO’s action at date 0 impacts earnings just
in period 1. The ﬁrm’s earnings are (a1,a 0,a 0,...).T h e ﬁrm chooses the




a0 (1 + C × T) − ω(T) (3)
Alternatively, suppose that the CEO’s action at date 0 impacts earnings
permanently. The ﬁrm’s earnings are (a1,a 1,a 1,...).T h e ﬁrm chooses the
3One can think of a0 as being productivity, or a simple transform of productivity. CES
models yield a direct mapping of productivity into earnings. For instance, suppose that




i /(1 − 1/η)
2 −
S
piQi. Hence, his demand for
good i satisﬁes pi = Q
−1/η
i /(1 − 1/η). We now analyze a typical ﬁrm, dropping the i.
The ﬁrm produces Q with a linear technology: Q = aL, where the cost of labor is 1, and
a is the ﬁrm’s productivity. The proﬁti sπ = pQ − Q/a = Q
1−1/η
i /(1 − 1/η) − Q/a.S o
the proﬁt-maximizing quantity is Q = a
η, the values of sales is pQ = a
η−1/(1 − 1/η),a n d
the realized proﬁti sπ = a
η−1/(η − 1).
5optimal talent CEO T, to maximizes the present value of earnings, net of





(1 + C × T) − ω(T)= :M (4)




S × C × T − ω(T) (5)
If the CEO’s action has a temporary impact, S = a0, while if the impact is
permanent, S = a0/r.
If CEO talent does not matter very much (CT close to 0), then a0 is close
to the earning of the ﬁrm (the realized earnings are a1), while a0/r is close
to the market capitalization M of the ﬁrm. Below, we mostly refer to “size”
as the “market capitalization”, but we are sympathetic to the interpretation
of “size” as “earnings”.4
We now turn to determination of the equilibrium wages. One needs to
allocate one CEO to each ﬁrm. It is clear, given the absence of asymmetric
information, that the equilibrium allocation will match the CEO indexed by
x with the ﬁrm indexed by x.W ec a l lw(x) the equilibrium compensation
of a CEO with index x.F i r m x, taking the compensation of each CEO
as given, picks the potential manager y that maximizes performance net of
salary:
max
y CS(x)T (y) − w(y) (6)
which gives: CS(x)T0 (y)−w0 (y). The optimum should have y = x. Hence:
w0 (x)=CS(x)T0 (x) (7)
The less talented CEO (x = X) has an opportunity wage, which for sim-





4The speciﬁcation (2) can be generalized. For instance, the CEO impact could be
assumed to be a1 = a0 + Ca
γ
0T+independent factors. If large ﬁrms are more diﬃcult to
change that small ﬁrms, then γ<1. One replaces then S by S
γ in our formulas. The
time-series prediction in Proposition 1 below may allow to determine γ empirically. We
believe γ =1is the natural benchmark, and it appears to be consistent with the long
term stylized facts.
5If the outside opportunity wage of the worse executive is w
∗, all the wages are increased
by w
∗. This does not change the conclusions at the top of the distribution, as w
∗ is likely
to be very small compared to the expressions derived in this paper.
6As this stage, we need functional forms. The ﬁrm size distribution is
t a k e nt ob eP a r e t ow i t he x p o n e n t1/α:
S (x)=Ax−α (9)
Empirically, the ﬁt is quite good, and yields α ' 1, a Zipf’s law. Axtell
2001, Luttmer 2005, Gabaix 2006 for evidence and theory on Zipf’s law for
ﬁrms.
For the talent distribution, we use a result from extreme value theory.
It shows that, for all “regular” continuous distributions, a large class that
includes all usual distributions (including linear, Gaussian, exponential, log-
normal, Weibull, Gumbel, Fréchet, Pareto), the following equation holds for
the spacings in the talent distribution:
T0 (x)=−Bxβ−1 (10)
in their upper tail, for some constant β and B, perhaps up to “a slowly
varying” function.6 Hence (10) should be considered a very innocuous func-
tional form, satisﬁed, to a ﬁrst degree of approximation, by any reasonable
distribution of talent. In the language of extreme value theory (Resnick,
1987), −β is the tail index of the distribution of talents, while α is the tail
index of the distribution of ﬁrm sizes.7. Eq. (10) allows us to reach deﬁnite
conclusion, at very low cost in generality.










In what follows, we assume α>β .






6L(x) is said to be slowly varying at 0 (e.g., Embrechts, Kluppelberg, and Mikosch
1997, p.564) if for all t>0,limx→0 L(tx)/L(x)=1 . Prototypical examples are L = a
and L(x)=aln1/x for a non-zero constant a. Hence, more precisely, for all usual
distributions, there is a slowly varying function L(x) such that T
0 (x)=−Bx
β−1L(x).
See Gabaix, Laibson and Li (2006), Appendix A and the ﬁrst Lemma of Appendix B, for a
formal statement of (10). If one replaces the constant B by a slowly varying function L(x),
all the theory belows remains, multiplying the expressions by slowly varying functions.
Sometimes, by some abuse of language, L(x) is called a “logarithmic correction” to the
power function Bx
β−1.
7Gabaix, Laibson and Li (2006, Table 1) contains a tabulation of the tail indices of
many usual distributions.
7To interpret Eq. 11, we consider a reference ﬁrm, for instance ﬁrm
number 250 — the median ﬁrm in the S&P500. Call its index x∗,a n di t ss i z e
S∗ = S (x∗). S∗ is the size of a “reference” or “typical” large ﬁrm, and can
be used for time-series prediction. We get:
Proposition 1 Call x∗ the index of a reference ﬁrm — e.g., the median ﬁrm
in a universe of large ﬁrms. In equilibrium, for large ﬁrms (small x), the








where S∗ is the size of the reference ﬁrm. In particular, the compensation





• Time-series prediction: compensation changes over time as the size of
the median ﬁrm S∗.
• Cross-section prediction: compensation varies with ﬁrm size as S1−β/α.
• Cross-country prediction: for a given ﬁrm size S,C E Oc o m p e n s a t i o n
will vary across countries, as the reference market capitalization S
β/α
∗
It the talent distribution and the population do not change,
−Cx∗T0(x∗)
α−β
is just a positive constant.
Proof. S∗ = Ax−α
∗ , x∗T0 (x∗)=Bx
−β
∗ , so from Eq. 11,













Eq. 12 predicts, that, the average wage depends linearly on the size of
the typical ﬁrm, S∗. For instance, in the U.S., between 1980 and 2000, the
average market capitalization of S&P 500 ﬁrms has increased by a factor of 8
(i.e. a 700% increase). The model predicts that CEO pay should increase by
af a c t o r8 .T h i se ﬀect is very robust. Suppose all ﬁrm sizes S are multiplied
by a factor λ.I nE q .8 ,t h er i g h t - h a n ds i d ei sm u l t i p l i e db yλ. Hence, the
wages, in the left-hand side, are multiplied by λ.
Second, Eq. 12, ﬁrst, predicts that the CEO compensation increases as a
power function of the size of the ﬁrm, S1−β/α. This relation has been found
8empirically many times (Kostiuk 1990, Rosen 1992), namely that w ∼ Sκ,
with κ ' 1/3. In our framework, κ =1−β/α. Using the empirical estimates
α ' 1,a n dκ ' 1/3,w eg e tβ ' 2/3.8
Third, the model predicts that CEOs heading similar ﬁrms in diﬀerent
countries will earn diﬀerent salaries. Suppose that the size S∗ of the 250th




∗ ), and, to simplify, that the distribution of talents at the top is
the same.9 Consider two ﬁrms of equal size, one Japanese, one American.
The salaries of their CEOs should not be equal. Indeed, according to Eq.
12, the salary of the US CEO should be Kβ/α higher than the Japanese
CEO.
We now oﬀer a few remarks.
In the baseline model, there is no incentive problem. A CEO works, with
no special incentives. Hence, the economist should not expect to see any
“pay for performance” relation, and there is no scandal if there is no link
between performance and pay.
A Rosen (1981) “superstar” eﬀect holds. If β>0, the talent distribution
has an upper bound, but the distribution of wages has no upper bound, as
the best managers are paired with very good ﬁr m s .T h er e a s o ni st h a tt h e
best managers’ talent is paired up with a very large ﬁrms, which allows them
to command a high compensation.
Finally, one can wonder how ﬁrms might know the spacings in the talent
distribution and its impact on a ﬁrm — β,a n dBC. One way is by looking at
the other ﬁrms. Proposition 1 implies than an “interpolation rule” is valid.
If a ﬁrm of size S is between two ﬁrms S1 and S2,w i t hS =
√
S1S2, then,
its CEO should be paid w =
√
w1w2:
Firm sizes satisfy S =
p
S1S2 ⇒ their CEO pays satisfy w =
√
w1w2 (14)
One could envision a dynamical process whereby a few ﬁrms increase their
compensation, perhaps because they think that C is high, and this makes
all ﬁrms follow in a dynamical version of (14). Working out such a dynam-
ics would be interesting, and could be parsimoniously modelled as a belief
8Hence, we learn something from this back-of-the enveloppe calibration about the dis-
tribution of CEO talents: its tail-index is −β = −2/3. It would be interesting to compare
it to other domains of human talent, such as athletes or artists. What is the spacing
between the times of top runners? one expects that it spaces as 10. What is the spacing
between the compensation of top artists?
9Section 4 discusses a possible impact of population size on the distribution of talents
at the top.
9about C. For simplicity, though, this paper assumes that the technological
parameters are all common knowledge.
Eq. 12 oﬀers a potential way to know if CEOs aﬀect primarily earnings,
or market capitalization — i.e., in the model at the beginning of this sec-
tion, if CEO impact is temporary is permanent. One would run a regression
of wages on earnings, sales, and market capitalization, and see which vari-
ables dominate. Technological change, or fashions, may change the relative
strength of earnings or market capitalization in setting CEO pay.10
3 Extension with pay-performance sensitivity
The previous section determined total compensation without assuming any
incentive problem. This section extends the model to allow to talk about







where c is the compensation, e ∈ {−1,0} is the eﬀort, λ ∈ (0,1) is a disutility
of eﬀort. The CEO is risk neutral, subject to limited liability, c ≥ 0. e =0
is the high eﬀort level, and e = −1 is “shirking”. As always, the “eﬀort”
should be interpreted broadly (Holmstrom and Milgrom 1990).
Eﬀort e and talent T increase the expected ﬁrm value in one year by the
following enrichment of Eq. 5:
S(T,e)=S(0) + CST + DSe (16)
The realized ﬁrm value is stochastic, e S = S(T,e)+ . The contract
should ensure that a high e is chosen.11 We study a particular compensation
package, that will turn out to be ﬁrst best.12 The CEO’s compensation c is
the sum of a base pay b,a n dn options:
c = b + n
³
e S − S(T,e)
´+
(17)
10This leaves a free parameter that may be detrimental to scientiﬁc discipline, but may
be relevant nonetheless. For instance, there was a stock market increase in the 1950s,
but, in Frydman (2005)’s sample, CEO pay did not move much. It could be that this was
because ﬁrms thought earnings, or sales, more relevant. Another possibility is that the
phenomenon is conﬁned to Frydman’s particular sample.
11[Insert short proof for this]
12Given the manager is risk neutral (for c ≥ 0), many compensation packages are
optimal.
10Normalizing the a share price to $1, the options are worth (r − µ)
+ :=
max(r − µ,0) at the end of the year.
At the optimum, eﬀort is high (e =0 ), and the CEO’s utility is E [c]=w,
the expected compensation. Hence, the market equilibrium is determined
in two, independent steps. First,.the market equilibrium of the previous
section determines w(x), the average compensation of a manager. Then, an
incentive scheme ensures high eﬀort, while keeping the total salary / utility
of w(x).




η+ − (η − D)
+¤
(18)
where η =  /S is the noise around stock returns and D is the percentage
decrease in ﬁrm value if the manager shirks.
The following compensation package oﬀers the ﬁr s tb e s ta m o u n to fi n -
centives, and is a solution of the competitive equilibrium. A manager of
talent T (x) is paired with a ﬁrm of size S (x), and receives an average com-
pensation w(x) determined in Proposition 1. He receives a ﬁxed base pay
f∗ and n∗ options, with:













The average compensation satisﬁes w(x)=f∗ + n∗E
∙³
e S − S(T,e)
´+¸
.
Proof. The manager should get his market wage: E [c | e =0 ]=w(x).W e
calculate:








= w(x) − n∆











| e = −1
¸




,i . e .
n ≥ n∗ := w(x)
λ
∆
11If b = w(x) − n∗E [η+] ≥ 0, this is the solution to the problem.
In the world described by Proposition 2, options are not indexed on the
market. Hence, an economist should not use the lack of option indexing as
evidence of ineﬃciency. Also, CEOs will be rewarded for luck (Bertrand and
Mullainathan 2001), but again, this does not violate eﬃciency. Both those
features are consistent with a ﬁr s tb e s tc o m p e n s a t i o ns c h e m e . 13
Calling σ the volatility of the ﬁrm’s stock price, the expected value from
the option is: E [η+]= σ √
2π.14 So the ratio of average compensation coming
from options to total compensation is:
Option share :=









The share of compensation that is given in options increases with the
volatility of the ﬁrm, but is independent of the size of a ﬁrm.
Jensen and Murphy (1998) and Hall and Liebman (2000), estimate em-
pirical pay-performance measures. Those measures, bI and bII, are obtained
by regressions of the type:
∆$Compensation = bI · ∆Value of the ﬁrm + controls
∆lnCompensation = bII · ∆lnValue of the ﬁrm + controls
Here, ∆lnValue of the ﬁrm is η,a n d∆Value of the ﬁrm is Sη. bI is the ab-
solute change in pay with the absolute change in the market valuation of the















The next Proposition derives predictions for those quantities.
Proposition 3 The pay-performance sensitivities for a manager in ﬁrm i
13The reason is that the manager is locally risk neutral, which may not be a bad ap-
proximation in the real world.










2π. Note that this is the
average expected payoﬀ of the option, not the Black-Scholes value, which typically diﬀers
from it by a small amount.
15One can deﬁne the b’s in terms of covariances, and one gets the same expressions if R





























The derivative of the option value with respect to the return is 1/2 on
average. So: E [dc/dη]=n∗/2. If the manager has n options, compensation
moves, on average, by a factor n/2 times the changes in returns. So in the

















































bI is the Jensen-Murphy (1990) measure. The model predicts that it
decreases with the size of a ﬁrm, with an elasticity equal to β/α,w h i c h
the previous calibration assessed to be around 1/3. Indeed, Jensen and
Murphy (1990), and the subsequent literature (Schaeﬀer 1998), have found





bII is predicted not to scale with ﬁrm size, at least in the baseline model,
where λ and ∆ do not depend on ﬁrm size.
134E x t e n s i o n s
4.1 If other ﬁrms pay their CEO more, how much is a ﬁrm
forced to follow?
If other ﬁrms increase their compensation, how much should a ﬁrm follow?
To answer this question, we observe that a shift in the “willingness to
compensate” can be modeled as a shift in C. Hence, we extend the model to
the case C’s may diﬀer across ﬁrms. Eq. 5 and 6 show that the “eﬀective”
size of a ﬁrm is b S = CS, and the model applies directly. For concreteness, we
say that ﬁrm i has a size Si and a statistically independent “CEO impact”
Ci,s oi t se ﬀective size is b Si = CiSi. We can now formulate the analogue of
Proposition 1.
Proposition 4 Suppose that ﬁrm i has a marginal impact of CEO talent






Call x∗ the index of a representative talent — e.g., the median ﬁrm in a uni-
verse of large talent. In equilibrium, for large ﬁrms (small x), the manager













Proof. We need to calculate the analogue of (9) for the eﬀective sizes
b Si = CiSi. For convenience, we set x to the be normalized between [0,1].














so b S (x)= b Ax−α with b A = AE
£
C1/α¤α
. Then, the proof of Proposition 4
applies.
14The proposition is useful for the following thought experiment. Suppose
that other ﬁrms believe that CEOs have become more productive, i.e. in-
crease their C by a factor λ>1, except for one ﬁrm, F, who does not believe
that CEOs became more productive, and keep the original C.S oC0
∗ = λC
while a ﬁrm F keeps its own C. How much will the pay at ﬁrm F change?
First, if ﬁrm F wants to keep the same CEO, then it needs to increase
his pay by a factor λ, i.e. “follow the herd” one for one. The reason is
simply that ﬁrm F’s CEO outside option is determined by the other ﬁrms
(as per Eq. 8), and has been multiplied by λ.
Alternatively, ﬁrm F may want to re-optimize, and get a new CEO —
with lower talent. Eq. 25 shows that the salary paid in ﬁrm F will still
be higher than the previous salary, by a factor λβ/α.W i t hβ/α =0 .7,i fa l l
ﬁrms increase their willingness to pay by 100% (λ =2 ) , ﬁrm F chooses to
increase its CEO pay by 20.7 − 1 = 60%. Such a high degree of “strategic
complementarity” may make the market for CEO quite reactive to shocks,
as initial shocks are not very dampened.
Another variant may be of interest. Suppose that a new sector, call it
the “fund management” sector, competes for the same pool of people with
the “corporate sector”. For simplicity, say that the distribution of funds and
ﬁr m si st h es a m e ,a n dt h a tt a l e n ta ﬀects a fund exactly as in Eq. 5, with
the same C. Then, the aggregate demand for talent has been multiplied by
2. The pay of a given talent is multiplied by 2, while the pay at a corporate
ﬁrm is multiplied by 2β/α. Hence it is plausible that competition from new
sectors, such as venture capital and the money management industry, have
exerted a quantitatively large pressure on CEO pay.16
4.2 Misperception of the cost of compensation
Hall and Murphy (2003) and Jensen and Murphy (2004) have persuasively
argued that at least some boards incorrectly perceived stock options to be
inexpensive because options create no accounting charge and require no cash
outlay. What is the impact on compensation?
To model this, say that the ﬁrm thinks that the pay, instead of costing
w,c o s t sw/M,w h e r eM>1 is a misperception of the cost of compensation.
Hence Eq. 6 for ﬁrm i becomes maxy CSiT (y) − w(y)/Mi i.e.
max
y CMiSiT (y) − w(y)
So, if the ﬁrm’s willingness to pay is multiplied by Mi.T h e e ﬀective C is
16See Kaplan (xx) for this view.
15now C0
i = CMi. The analysis of section 4.1 applies: If all ﬁrms underesti-
mate the cost of compensation by λ = M, then total compensation increases
by λ, and even a “rational” ﬁrm that does not underestimate compensation,
will increase its pay by λβ/α if it is willing to change CEOs, and will in-
creases its pay by λ if it does not want to change CEOs. Hence, other ﬁrms’
misperceptions aﬀect considerably a rational ﬁrm.
4.3 Executives below the CEO
One could generalize the model to the top H executives of each ﬁrm, assum-
ing the enrichment of Eq. 2: a1/a0 =1+
PH
h=1 ChTh.T h e h−th ranked
executive improves ﬁrm productivity by his talent Th and a sensitivity Ch,










The next Proposition describes the equilibrium outcome.
Proposition 5 (Extension of Proposition 1 to the top H executives). In a
model where the top H executives increase ﬁrm value, the compensation for

















Hence, the predictions of Proposition 1 apply directly to the top H
executives. From Eq. 28, one can estimate Ch from the salaries. In a given
ﬁrm, the ratio between the CEO’s pay and that of the h-th executive is
(C1/Ch)
1−β/α.
The proof is very simple. As per Eq. 27, each ﬁrm behaves as H inde-
pendent ﬁrms, with eﬀective size ChS, h =1 ...H.
To be completed. . The proof follows the proof of Proposition 4. The






















and the h-th executive in ﬁrm i earns (28).
165 A calibration
We propose a calibration for the model. We hope it is a useful step in the
long-run goal of calibratable corporate ﬁnance.
5.1 Calibrating CEO talent
We present here indicative numbers, that will be made more exact in a future
iteration of this paper. The empirical evidence (Axtell 2001, Luttmer 2005)
on Zipf’s law suggests:17
α =1
The evidence on the ﬁrm-size elasticity suggests w ∼ S1/3,w h i c hb yE q .1 2
implies
β =2 /3
Av a l u eβ<1 implies that the distribution has an upper bound Tmax,
and that in the upper tail of the talent density is (up to a slowly varying
function of Tmax − T):
P (T>t )=B0 (Tmax − t)
1/β for t close to Tmax
We index ﬁrms by rank, the largest ﬁrm having rank x =1 .F o r -





= x/N. The median ﬁrm in the S&P500 has rank x∗ = 250.
Units are 2005 dollars. The CEO’s compensation is about w∗ =8· 106.
The market capitalization of ﬁrm x∗ = 250 is: S∗ =5 ·109. Using Proposition








S∗ ,i . e .
BC =1· 10−5 (30)
It means that, the diﬀerence in marginal product between the top CEO and
the 2nd CEO is CT0 (1) = BC =1 0 −5. The top CEO increases a ﬁrm’s
market value by only 10−3%. This means that the spacings between talent
c a nl o o kv e r ys m a l l . B u tt h i sv e r ys m a l ld i ﬀerence is big enough, in this
neoclassical model, to generate large diﬀerences in compensation.
Tervio (2003), backs up talent diﬀerences in CEOs over a range. We
answer his question in our framework. The diﬀerence of talent between the
top CEO and the K-th CEO is:












17Here we use strict equalities, when we should be using approximate equalities.
17For K = 1000,t h i sd i ﬀerences yields: C (T (1) − T (1000)) = 0.2%.I fﬁrm
#1 replace its CEO #1 with CEO #1000, and kept that CEO for 10 years
(a typical CEO tenure, see Denis and Denis 1995), its value would decrease
by only 2%.18
In the “temporary impact” interpretation, where CEO aﬀects earnings
for just one year, one multiplies the estimate of talent by the price-earnings
ratio. Taking an empirical P/E ratio of 15, replacing CEO #1000 by CEO
#1 increases earnings by: 15 × 0.2% = 3%.
Such a small diﬀerence might be due to the diﬃculty of inferring talent.
Suppose that the market gets only an noisy signal of talent: the value of the
talent, plus ﬁrm-level noise, over 10 years: T + σε.A saﬁrst pass, consider
the case where quantities are normally distributed. The posterior estimate of
talent is a constant plus (T + σε)/(1 + σ2/var(T)).I fﬁrm level volatility
is 30%, then the averaged noise over 10 years is has standard deviation
σ = 30%/101/2 ' 10%.I fT has standard deviation 1%, then the standard
deviation of the posterior will be var(T)/
¡
var(T)+σ2¢1/2 =0 .1%.T h e
noise is so large, that the best estimates of talents have very small standard
deviation.
Another way to put the ﬁnding (30) the following. If there is a paradox
in CEO pay, it is that ﬁrms must think that CEOs do not have very superior
talents (at least, that there is little diﬀerence between CEO #1 and CEO
#1000), as they pay them so little.
5.2 Calibrating eﬀort and incentives
We use ∆ ∼ D/2 and Eq. 23, which gives bII = λ/D. In the model, there
is no way to know λ or D separately, but λ/D can be identiﬁed. What is a
good value for D, which is the amount by how much a ﬁrm value decreases
i ft h eC E Os l a c k s ? W et h i n kt h a t30% is a plausible upper bound: D . 0.3.
The empirical literature (Murphy 1999) ﬁnds bII ' 1/3. So we conclude:
λ ≤ 0.30 × 1/3=0 .10. This means that utility that the CEO gets from
shirks is around 10% of total pay, at most. CEOs receive relatively weak
incentives, so ﬁrms must think that the shirking problem relatively minor.
18Event studies ﬁnd that, when a founder dies, the market value goes up by about 3%
(cite...). This means that the founder’s talent is far from the talent in the “market for
CEOs”, while in the market for CEOs, estimates of talent are quite homogenous.
186C o n c l u s i o n
We provided a simple, calibratable competitive model of CEO compensa-
tion. Its structure is very simple, and it can be extended in many directions.
In addition, it appears consistent with the main facts about CEO compen-
sation, including with the recent rise in CEO . It generalizes readily to the
top H executives in a ﬁrm. The model can be extended to analyze stock
options, the impact of outside opportunities for CEO talent (such as the
money management industry), and the impact of misperception of the price
of options on the average compensation. Finally, the model allows us to
propose a calibration of various quantities of interest in corporate ﬁnance
and macroeconomics, the dispersion and impact of CEO talent, and the cost
and impact CEO eﬀort.
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Figure 2: Average market capitalization of ﬁrms in the S&P 500, in constant
2000 dollars, from the Center for Research in Securities Prices. The model
(Proposition 1) predicts that the average top CEO pay should be propor-
tional to the market capitalization of the top ﬁrms (e.g., the ﬁrms in the
S&P 500), hence proposes an explanation for the concomittance of the rise
of CEO pay (Figure 1) and stock market valuations (this Figure 2).
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